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Talk Show Torts Turn Deaf Ear to Plaintiffs
JOSEPH A. TOMAIN
In August 2004, a New York appellate
court dismissed a lawsuit filed by
Sheila C., a minor, who alleged that talk
show host Maury Povich and the pro-
ducers of The Maury Povich Show had
negligently put her in contact with a
limousine driver who later raped her.'
This dismissal is the latest in a line of
defense victories in cases involving
"talk show torts"-claims based on
appearances on popular television talk
shows-illustrating that the talk show
genre has provided less than fertile
ground for plaintiffs.
This article reviews Sheila C. v. Povich
and its predecessor talk show cases. As
the cases demonstrate, the courts have
been reluctant to impose duties on talk
show producers that extend beyond the
conduct of the talk show taping itself, and
also have rejected claims of invasion of
privacy and defamation on the part of talk
show guests and those connected to them.
At least for the time being, it seems
unlikely that the talk show genre will be
the next big hit for plaintiffs.
Sorry, Guests, Our
Duty Is to the Viewers
Sheila C. and the well-known case
against the producers of The Jenny
Jones Show2 reflect the judiciary's
reluctance to impose a duty on talk
shows to protect their guests from the
tortious acts of third parties that occur
after an episode has been taped and the
guests have left the studio, even though
the show may have played a role in
stirring the tortfeasor to action.
In Sheila C., a fourteen-year-old
female guest of The Maury Povich Show,
Sheila, sued Povich, the show, its pro-
ducers, and its distributors, alleging that
they negligently allowed a man who
identified himself as "Maury's limo
driver" to rape her hours after taping
the episode, even though she had left
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the studio and had been released into the
custody of her mother and grandmother.3
When The Maury Povich Show solicit-
ed guests to appear on an episode entitled
"Out of Control Teens," Sheila's mother
responded. Sheila's mother allegedly
informed the show's staff of Sheila's age
and told them that she was undergoing
counseling, she was on medication for
emotional illness, she recently attempted
suicide, she recently lost an immediate
family member, and she reported having
sexual intercourse with one twenty-nine-
year old man and five males who were
under age sixteen. In exchange for
Sheila's appearance on Maury Povich,
the defendants offered to provide follow-
up psychological counseling, send Sheila
to a corrective "teen boot camp," make
transportation and hotel arrangements,
and pay related expenses.
Before taping began, a defendant and
another staff member allegedly told
Sheila to act sexually provocative and
to wear only her thigh-length top with-
out slacks so that she would appear
"sexier,'" which would be "better for the
show." As Sheila watched other guests
being taped, a man introduced himself
to her as "Maury's limo driver." He
asked for her contact information in
New York and offered to show her
around the city later that night. Sheila
gave him this information, taped the
episode, and returned to her hotel with
her mother and grandmother. When
"Maury's limo driver" showed up at
Sheila's hotel, her mother and grand-
mother turned him away, but he per-
suaded Sheila to sneak out. Allegedly,
"Maury's limo driver" drove her to a
dark area, climbed in the back of the
limousine, and raped her.
Sheila sued for negligent retention
and negligent supervision, both based
on the limousine driver's conduct. The
defendants contended that the negli-
gence claims should be dismissed
because they did not owe a duty of care
to Sheila. After noting that negligence
is a "matter of time, place, and circum-
stance,"4 the trial court found that the
following allegations established the
existence of a duty of care: (1) the show
solicited a minor for commercial purpos-
es and brought her into the state; (2) it
knew that she had emotional difficulties;
(3) it represented itself as having expert-
ise in remedying problems of "out of
control" teens; (4) "Maury's limo driver"
was able to approach Sheila on the set
and gain her contact information;
(5) after taping, the show permitted the
minor to leave under the supervision of
two adults who admittedly could not
control her; and (6) no other precautions
were taken to protect the minor.
On the negligent hiring and retention
claim, the trial court held that there
were relevant facts exclusively within
the defendants' control regarding
"Maury's limo driver" that made dis-
missal at the pleading stage improper.
As to the negligent supervision
claim, the defendants unsuccessfully
argued that the show should not be
responsible for the alleged rape because
they were not directly supervising
"Maury's limo driver" at the time of
the incident. In response, the trial court
stated: "A caretaker is not automatically
exempt from responsibility merely
because of a suspension of physical
supervision of an injured minor where,
as here, the conditions created by the
caretaker are still in effect"
'6
The appellate court reversed the trial
court on both claims. First, it dismissed
the negligent hiring and retention claim
because Sheila failed to allege that defen-
dants knew or should have known of
"Maury's limo driver's" propensity for the
type of conduct that allegedly occurred.7
Second, the court dismissed the negli-
gent supervision claim, finding that the
defendants owed no duty to Sheila at the
time of the alleged rape. Generally, the
court noted, defining the orbit of duty is
not the result of an algebraic formula.
"Rather, [duty] coalesces from vectored
forces including logic, science, weighty
competing socioeconomic policies and
Spring 2005 ED Communications Lawyer ED 5
sometimes contractual assumptions of
responsibility.' 8 Specifically, the question
of duty in Sheila C. was "whether a tem-
porary custodian has a continuing duty
to protect a child from harm once that
child has been returned to the custody of
a parent or guardian or, as in this case,
both a parent and a guardian."9 The court
Courts have been reluctant
to impose duties on talk
show producers that extend
beyond the conduct of the
talk show taping itself.
answered this question in the negative,
signaling that talk show producers'
duties over their guests--even minors
allegedly placed in risky circum-
stances-end at a taping's conclusion.
Perhaps It's Better Left Unsaid
The appellate decision in Sheila C. was
consistent with the final result in Graves
v. Warner Bros., a lawsuit against the
producers of The Jenny Jones Show that
attracted considerable publicity following
a $29 million trial verdict in the plain-
tiff's favor and later reversed on appeal.
Graves arose from an appearance by
Scott Amedure and Jonathan Schmitz on
The Jenny Jones Show in Chicago.
Although Schmitz knew that the episode
was about secret crushes, he did not know
the that episode was entitled "Same-Sex
Crushes" because the producers intention-
ally withheld this information from him.
During the taping, Amedure revealed his
secret crush on Schmitz. Three days after
taping, back home in Michigan, Schmitz
killed Amedure and was subsequently
found guilty of second-degree murder."
Amedure's personal representatives sued
The Jenny Jones Show producers for
wrongful death, alleging that the produc-
ers knew or should have known that
"ambushing" Schmitz with Amedure's
secret same-sex crush for the "sole pur-
pose" of increasing television ratings
would "unnecessarily and unreasonably
expose [Amedure] to the risk of harm"
and incite Schmitz to violence. 1
In May 1999, a Michigan jury found
the defendants liable to Scott's personal
representatives for $29 million. The
jury verdict was based on a finding that
the producers "ambushed"12 Schmitz
with the surprise topic and revelation
of a same-sex crush. The award raised
concerns that a wave of lawsuits seek-
ing to hold talk shows, their hosts, pro-
ducers, and owners civilly liable might
be next season's big trend. Multiple
commentators addressed this decision,
noting that the law of talk show torts
"remains unsettled"1 and that viewers
should "stayed tuned" 4 to find out just
how far this emerging trend of talk
show torts would go toward expanding
media liability.
In 2002, however, the Michigan
appellate court reversed and granted
summary judgment to the defendants,
holding that the talk show owed no
duty to Amedure to protect him from
Schmitz. Specifically, the court found
that no special relationship existed
between the television show and its
guest that created an obligation to pro-
tect Amedure from the criminal acts of
a third party. Invoking a basic negli-
gence standard, the court ruled that the
only duty owed to Amedure was that of
a business host to a business guest, an
obligation that ended three days prior to
the murder, hundreds of miles away in
another state. 5
Graves includes a strong dissent,
which argues that the plaintiffs adequate-
ly demonstrated active misconduct on
the part of the defendants.I According
to the dissent, the defendants used lies,
deceit, and outrageous behavior to
ensure that Schmitz would appear on
the show, while hiding the true nature
of the episode-same-sex crushes. The
dissent concluded that, for the defendants
to be held liable for the consequences
of Schmitz's actions, Schmitz's murder
of Amedure did not itself need to be
foreseeable. Rather, the dissent con-
cluded more generally that
as a matter of public policy, if defendants, for
their own benefit, wish to produce "ambush"
shows that can conceivably create a volatile
situation, they should bear the risk if a guest is
psychologically unstable or criminally danger-
ous by being charged with that knowledge in
the context of any foreseeability analysis."
The Graves dissent notwithstanding,
both Graves and Sheila C. were ulti-
mately resolved, as a matter of law, in
the defendants' favor. Both courts found
that a talk show does not owe its guests
a duty of care for the intentional acts of
a third party that occur away from the
studio, whether that third party be the
host's limo driver or another guest. A
brief review of other talk show cases
reveals a similar reluctance to impose
tort liability.
That's None of Your Business!
In addition to negligence claims, talk
show plaintiffs have attempted to rely
on several other tort claims, including
the four privacy torts. Interestingly, the
invasion of privacy cases show that
willing talk show guests are not the
only plaintiffs who face difficulty in
establishing these claims, but that fami-
ly, friends, and "acquaintances" of
guests, regardless of their consent, are
also subject to having their dirty laun-
dry aired before millions of viewers.
Anonsen v. Donahue8 applies the
First Amendment principle that pre-
cludes a claim for public disclosure of
private facts when a logical nexus exists
between a person's identity and a mat-
ter of public interest. While Miriam
Booher and her ex-husband were still
married, he raped and impregnated her
eleven-year-old daughter, his step-
daughter. She gave birth to a son, who
was raised as her half-brother, the "son"
of Miriam. Many years later, the truth
was told to the "son." Sometime after
that, Miriam appeared on Donahue and
revealed this story of rape, incest, and
her own victimization resulting from
these life-changing events. Miriam's
daughter and grandson filed suit against
her, Phil Donahue, the show's producer,
the show's owner, and a local television
station for invasion of privacy-public
disclosure of private facts. The appel-
late court affirmed the trial court's sum-
mary judgment for the defendants,
holding that Miriam's story was pro-
tected by the First Amendment.
Although Miriam did not reveal the
identity of her daughter or grandson,
she did reveal her own. The plaintiffs
alleged that Miriam's revelations neces-
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sarily led to the discovery of their iden-
tities, thereby invading their privacy.
While the court acknowledged that such
revelation was a likely outcome, Miriam
was free to disclose her own identity.
The court reasoned that there was a logi-
cal nexus between Miriam's identity and
a matter of legitimate public interest, i.e.,
the rape, incest, cover-up, and eventual
discovery. The court emphasized that "to
hold otherwise would be to imply that
one's autobiography must be written
anonymously."19 Thus, Anonsen signals
that if there is a logical nexus between a
matter of legitimate public interest and
one's identity as revealed on a talk show,
then a claim for public disclosure of
private facts cannot trump the First
Amendment right to free speech, even
outside of a hard news context.
Judge Posner's "Final Thoughts"
Sixteen-year-old Tammy, her sister, and
their stepmother and stepsister, volun-
teered to appear on The Charlie Perez
Show when they learned that the show
was planning to tape an episode about
tensions between stepparents and
stepchildren. Tammy joined her sister in
making some sharp-tongued attacks
directed at her stepmother, accusing her
of beginning an affair with their father
before he divorced their mother. The
stepmother fired back by reading from a
police report about Tammy that indicat-
ed that she exhibited violent, profane,
and indecent behavior. The report also
noted that Tammy had described herself
as the biggest gangster in town. At this
point, visibly pregnant Tammy wryly
smiled at the engaged studio audience,
did a full turn, and asked, "do I look
like a gangster?"
Although the show was taped two
weeks before airing, Tammy never
requested that this segment of the show
be removed. After the show broadcast,
however, Tammy suffered unbearable
teasing, had to change schools, and
sued the show. In Howell v. Tribune
Entertainment Co., Tammy sued for
invasion of privacy by public disclosure
of private fact, alleging that either Perez
"should have interrupted the program
when he realized that the stepmother
was reading from a police report or the
defendant should have erased that part
of the tape before the broadcast."2
The trial court dismissed Tammy's
claims, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The court noted that reading from a
police record may not even qualify as a
private fact, but stated that it need not
address this issue." Instead, the court
held that "a person whose character is
assailed can respond with facts bearing
on the character of her assailant that
might otherwise be off limits."22
The Seventh Circuit also recognized
that a talk show should not be liable for
the acts of a third party: "It is one thing
to impose liability on the press for
invading someone's privacy, and anoth-
er to prevent or take steps to rectify an
invasion of privacy by another."23
Moreover, the court stated that "the
stepmother and derivatively the broad-
caster were entitled to use private facts
about the plaintiff to rebut her very
public attack on the stepmother's own
private character."24
While finding for the defense, the
Seventh Circuit in Howell stopped short
of expressing approval for the talk show
from which the lawsuit arose. Rather
Judge Posner offered his own "final
thoughts" on the case: "[W]e do not
mean to express approval of the practice
of broadcasters of inviting teenagers to
place themselves in embarrassing situa-
tions on television.
25
Topless Dancers in a False Light?
In Fronning v. Jones, topless dancers
unsuccessfully alleged that an episode
of The Jenny Jones Show entitled "His
Bachelor Party Ruined Our Marriage"
gave rise to invasion of privacy. 6 During
this episode, Mr. and Mrs. Busch
appeared and told their story of how their
marriage suffered due to the hiring of
topless dancers for his bachelor party.
As Mrs. Busch told the audience of her
anger upon discovering photos of two
topless dancers giving Mr. Busch a "lap
dance," these photos were intermittently
shown to the studio and television audi-
ences. Although the dancers' names were
not mentioned, their faces were identifi-
able in several of the pictures. The
dancers, who were described as "home
wreckers," received no advance notice
that their images would appear on the
show, and sued for misappropriation of
likeness, public disclosure of private
facts, and false light. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defen-
dants on all three claims.
The dancers appealed the dismissal of
their false light claim. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment on this
claim, reasoning that "[a]lthough the title
of the show was His Bachelor Party
Ruined Our Marriage, the Busches-
who are still married-appeared good-
humored and at ease with each other
throughout the broadcast."2 Moreover,
Mrs. Busch stated that she intended to
remain married. Thus, the court held that
no reasonable juror could conclude that
the dancers' performance actually ruined
the Busches' marriage or that they were
"home wreckers.
28
Bad Boys' Names Have
No Intrinsic Value
Although COPS is not a talk show,
Reeves v. Fox Television Network29 fol-
lows a similar line of analysis to talk
show cases, and illustrates the difficulty
that a plaintiff is likely to encounter in
establishing a claim for invasion of pri-
vacy if he or she has willingly agreed to
appear on television.
On August 30, 1993, Willie Reeves
was in an altercation with another man.
When police and a COPS camera crew
arrived at his home to investigate,
Reeves answered the door and allowed
them inside. After the incident appeared
on COPS, Reeves sued Fox Television,
the producer of COPS, as well as the
police and the City of Cleveland, alleg-
ing that these defendants had commit-
ted all four privacy torts. The court
granted summary judgment on all of
Reeves's claims.
First, the court found that the
"Cleveland Police Department's response
to a call regarding a violent crime, their
investigation and arrest of a suspect are
all matters of legitimate public con-
cern."3 Further, the court held that
Reeves's address, his physical descrip-
tion, and images of him being escorted
in handcuffs were not private facts."
Second, the court dismissed Reeves's
misappropriation claim on the basis
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that it requires more than the mere
publication of one's name or likeness.
Instead, a plaintiff must allege that his
or her "name or likeness has some
intrinsic value, which was taken by
defendant for its own benefit, commer-
cial or otherwise."32 On this element, the
court found that Reeves's name and
likeness had no intrinsic value, notwith-
standing the profit motive of the COPS
producers: "[T]he fact that the defen-
dant is engaged in the business of publi-
cation.., out of which he makes or
seeks to make a profit, is not enough to
make the incidental publication a com-
mercial use of the name or likeness. 33
Third, Reeves lost on his claim for
false light because Ohio does not recog-
nize this invasion of privacy tort.34
Finally, Reeves's claims for intrusion
upon seclusion and trespass failed. His
Talk show guests have not
had any greater success
with defamation claims
than with other torts.
own testimony, as well as videotaped
footage of the arrest, show that he con-
sented to the police and the camera
crew entering his home. 35
Apparitions Have No Claim to Privacy
Mineer v. Williams36 is a story about a
mother, a psychic, and a talk show. In
October 1997, a teenage girl, Erica,
disappeared. In September 1998, while
Erica was still missing, a psychic
appeared on The Montel Williams Show
to help guests learn information about
loved ones who were missing or dead.
Erica's mother appeared on the show and
asked the psychic whether anyone had
information about her missing daughter.
The psychic told her that Erica was mur-
dered and that a man named Chris had
information. Although the show edited
the sound to eliminate the name "Chris,"
viewers could read the psychic's lips and
discern the name. One day after the
show aired, Chris Mineer, who knew
Erica, shot and killed his girlfriend and
then committed suicide. Four months
later, the psychic appeared on Montel
Williams again. Describing the psychic's
"powers," Williams told the audience
that the psychic had given Erica's moth-
er Chris Mineer's name during the break
of the September 1998 episode. Williams
explained that Chris killed his girlfriend
and himself in a panic, believing that he
would soon be arrested for a crime that
he committed.
Chris's mother sued Williams, the
producers of The Montel Williams
Show, and the psychic for false light
invasion of privacy. The court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss, applying
the Restatement principle that, "'[e]xcept
for the appropriation of one's likeness, an
action for invasion of privacy can be
maintained only by a living individual
whose privacy is invaded.' '37
Guest Pass for Defamation?
Talk show guests have not had any
greater success with defamation claims
than with other torts. As with other tort
claims, defamation claims generally fail
because talk show guests create or vol-
untarily participate in situations that
they eventually regret.
When Everybody Knows Your Name
Reeves v. Fox Television, discussed
above, rejected privacy claims based on
an appearance on COPS, largely because
the plaintiff permitted a camera crew to
enter his home. Similarly, defamation
claims arising from the talk show con-
text have been dismissed as a result of
the plaintiffs' voluntary conduct in
appearing on television, which in some
instances has been held to give rise to
public figure status.
In Anderson v. Rocky Mountain
News," the plaintiff sued a newspaper
based on the defamatory statement that
he was jailed for violating a child cus-
tody agreement. The appellate court
affirmed summary judgment for the
newspaper because the plaintiff was a
public figure-based on his prior
appearance on a television talk show-
who could not establish actual malice.
While in the middle of a custody
dispute, the plaintiff crossed state lines
with his daughter. In response to a
request for guests, the plaintiff contact-
ed The Phil Donahue Show, offering to
appear on an episode concerning
fathers' rights. He appeared on two
episodes. Although he appeared in dis-
guise, his wife recognized him and the
plaintiff was apprehended. Shortly
thereafter, the newspaper published an
article on this custody battle, including
a prior incident in which the Houston
police asked the plaintiff to remain in a
holding room. The plaintiff sued over
the paper's characterization of the
Houston incident as an arrest.
The court granted the defendants sum-
mary judgment, finding that the father
was a public figure and that he could not
establish actual malice. Citing Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. ," the court held that,
when the father invited media attention
by appearing on Donahue to discuss
child snatching and fathers' rights, he
thrust himself into a public controversy
and became a public figure for these
issues. This status and his inability to
establish actual malice resulted in sum-
mary judgment for the defendants.
Similarly, in Contemporary Mission,
Inc. v. New York Times Co.,4" the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed summary judgment for the
New York Times Co., finding that the
plaintiffs were limited-purpose public
figures who could not establish actual
malice. The New York Times reported
on religious and business controversies
concerning Contemporary Mission,
Inc., and several of its priests. Specifi-
cally, the Times reported allegations
that the priests forged proof of their
ordinations and that the Mission was a
front to attain tax-exempt status for its
successful mail-order business. The
priests and the Mission sued the
newspaper for defamation.
During the underlying religious
controversy, the Mission had formed a
folk-rock group, The Mission Singers.
In addition to performing hundreds
of concerts, The Mission Singers
"appeared on numerous television and
talk radio shows, including television
shows such as the Ed Sullivan Show,
the Mike Douglas Show, and the Joey
Bishop Show."'" One of the priests com-
posed a rock-opera, Virgin, which sold
20,000 copies."
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These public appearances, particular-
ly the television shows, formed the
basis of the court's finding that the
plaintiffs were public figures. After cit-
ing Gertz, the court also cited the four-
part test announced in Lerman v. Flynt
Distributing Co., Inc.," for determining
limited-purpose public figure status:'
A defendant must show the plaintiff has: (1)
successfully invited public attention to his
views in an effort to influence others prior to
the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2)
voluntarily injected himself into a public con-
troversy related to the subject of the litigation;
(3) assumed a position of prominence in the
public controversy; and (4) maintained regular
and continuing access to the media."
Applying the Lerman test, the court
found that the priests were limited-pur-
pose public figures because they thrust
themselves to the forefront of a public
controversy, the religious controversy.
4
1
Seeking to avoid public figure status,
the priests argued that because the
religious controversy occurred almost
twenty years earlier, they were no
longer public figures. The court rejected
this argument noting that "the passage
of time will not necessarily change an
individual's status as a public figure."
47
The plaintiffs then argued that they
were not limited-purpose public figures
for purpose of the business controversy
because they had not voluntarily entered
into this controversy. The court agreed
that the plaintiffs did not thrust them-
selves to the forefront of the business
controversy because "they had not uti-
lized the media to further their points or
to sway public opinion on the matter."48
Nevertheless, the court held that the
plaintiffs qualified as limited-purpose
public figures for the business controver-
sy because it was "necessarily inter-
twined with the religious controversy. 49
Thus, when two public controversies
intertwine, a party can become a limited-
purpose public figure for both simply by
thrusting itself, even on a television
show, to the forefront of one of them.
Misty Tales Episode I
Misty Nicole Weber, a minor, and her
mother sued Sally Jesse Raphael and
the producers of her show for defama-
tion based on the allegation that they
induced Misty to portray a prostitute on
the episode entitled "I Want My Teen
Daughter Off the Street." Before the
show, Misty claimed she was a prosti-
tute, but in her lawsuit she alleged that
she was not a prostitute and had only
been induced by the show to portray
one. To determine which statement was
truthful, the defendants propounded
interrogatories requesting the names
of every person with whom Misty had
a sexual relationship, and every person
who provided Misty with illegal drugs.
The plaintiffs sought to limit the
scope of these interrogatories to
whether she was a prostitute and, if so,
the names of her customers. The court
found that the defendants were entitled
to the interrogatory responses request-
ed, noting that the defendants were "not
required to accept plaintiff Weber's self-
reporting on this issue."51 The court fur-
ther explained that not only was the
information relevant to whether Misty
was a prostitute but it was also relevant
to her claim for damages for injury to
her reputation. But this decision is only
a small part the Misty Nicole Weber
legal saga.
Misty Tales Episode II
In addition to asserting a defamation
claim, Misty claimed that the show mis-
appropriated her image for commercial
purposes by portraying her as a prosti-
tute, even though she told the show
before taping that she was one and that
her appearance was voluntary. The
defendants moved to dismiss Misty's
claims for misappropriation, arguing that
the newsworthiness privilege applied.5"
The court rejected Misty's argument
that The Sally Jesse Raphael Show is
"unworthy" of the newsworthiness
privilege "because of the nature of the
forum, a television talk show."53 In a
passage unlikely to amuse print journal-
ists, the court observed that "television
talk shows are the equals of The New
York Times in the eyes of the law. 54
Based on that finding, plus the plain-
tiffs' concession that the show's topic-
teen runaways and teenage prostitu-
tion-was a matter of public concern,
the court found that the newsworthiness
privilege can apply to talk shows.
Nonetheless, the court denied the
motion to dismiss based on a factual dis-
pute: "If the defendants knew that Weber
was not a prostitute, then the Show was
riddled with substantial falsification and
fictionalization."55 Thus, this invasion of
privacy claim survived dismissal because
the court found that substantial fictional-
ization of Misty could trump the news-
worthiness privilege.
Misty Tales Episode III
Although the misappropriation claims
survived the motion to dismiss, they
were defeated on summary judgment."
As noted, the court previously sustained
the misappropriation claims because the
newsworthiness privilege would not
apply if the show engaged in substantial
fictionalization concerning whether
Misty was a teenage prostitute. But,
an unrelated case intervening between
these two Misty opinions held that
"there is no 'substantial fictionalization'
limitation on the newsworthiness excep-
tion."'57 In the face of this holding, the
court granted summary judgment on the
misappropriation claims.
Misty's defamation and negligence
claims also failed on summary judg-
ment. The defamation claim failed for
three independent reasons. First, Misty's
voluntary appearance on the show
claiming to be a prostitute barred her
defamation claim. As the court
"There is no 'substantial
fictionalization' limitation
on the newsworthiness
exception."
observed, "'there is no publication,' and
therefore no liability, 'if the defamatory
statement is exposed to a third party by
the person claiming to be defamed."'58
Second, under New York law, a party
cannot be liable for defamation when a
story is "'arguably within the sphere of
legitimate public concern' . . . unless
'the publisher acted in a grossly irre-
sponsible manner."'59 The court held
that the talk show defendants did not
act in a grossly irresponsible manner
because they reasonably relied on the
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expertise of a person hired to identify
potential guests. Third, this person, to
whom Misty allegedly said before the
show that she was not a prostitute, was
an independent contractor with expert-
ise in finding potential guests for the
show, was not an employee of the show,
and his knowledge could not be imput-
ed to the show's producers.
As a result of the elimination of the
defamation claim, Misty's negligence
claim necessarily failed. Because the
negligence claim was merely a deriva-
tive of the defamation claim, it could
not survive standing alone. The court
noted that to hold otherwise would be
a "transparent and impermissible
attempt to evade the exacting require-
ments that New York has imposed on a
claim for defamation. 6 0
When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes
Even when a court allows a talk show
tort case to survive dismissal, it can
express its displeasure in doing so.
Ahron Leichtman, a guest on a talk
radio show, sued the host, the host's
employer, and another guest (a talk
show host from the same station) for
battery, invasion of privacy, and viola-
tion of a city health regulation. 61
Specifically, Leichtman alleged that he
was a nationally known antismoking
advocate who appeared on Bill
Cunningham's radio talk show on the
date of the Great American Smokeout.
During Leichtman's appearance,
Cunningham's other guest, Andy
Furman, repeatedly blew cigar smoke
in his face, allegedly "for the purpose
of causing physical discomfort, humili-
ation, and distress. 62
The appellate court reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the battery claim
because, under Ohio law, smoke is a
"particulate matter" capable of making
contact, thus satisfying the physical
contact element of the battery tort.63
The court did, however, affirm the dis-
missal of the invasion of privacy and city
smoking regulation claims. The court
found that the invasion of privacy claim
could not withstand dismissal because
Leichtman "willingly entered the WLW
studio to make a public radio appearance
with Cunningham, who is known for his
blowtorch rhetoric."' Thus, there could
be no claim for intrusion upon seclusion.
The smoking regulation claim was dis-
missed because the regulation did not
create a private right of action.
Although the court permitted the
battery claim to survive, it spent two
paragraphs expressing its disdain that
such a case would clog a court's docket.
The court noted that this "case empha-
sizes the need for some form of alterna-
tive dispute resolution operating totally
outside the court system as a means
to provide an attentive ear to the
parties and a resolution of disputes in
a nominal case."65
And Now... A Word
from Our Sponsor
Barring the Graves dissent's viewpoint
being adopted by a majority, the courts
that have considered talk show torts offer
scant reason for optimism among would-
be plaintiffs. Graves and Sheila C. both
hold that courts view the relationship
between a talk show and its guests as one
between a business invitor and invitees.
Once this temporary relationship efids, so
does the duty of care. In Graves, that
relationship was clearly over when three
days had passed since the taping and the
guests were hundreds of miles away in
another state before the incident giving
rise to the suit occurred. In Sheila C., that
duty ended at the time the guest left the
physical custody of the talk show and
was released into the custody of her
mother and grandmother, even though the
incident occurred the same night of tap-
ing and involved the host's limo driver.
Courts considering claims of defama-
tion and invasion of privacy have shown
a similar reluctance to impose liability
on talk show producers. On those
claims, the courts have emphasized that
a plaintiff's voluntary appearance and
disclosure of personal information, or
the public significance of a talk show's
topic, likely will defeat claims based on
reputational or privacy interests.
On the whole, talk show cases and
their outcomes strongly suggest that the
safest place for talk show fans is at
home watching television, rather than
on the stage of this still-evolving form
of broadcast entertainment.
Endnotes
1. Sheila C. v. Povich, 11 A.D.3d 120
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
2. Graves v. Warner Bros., 656 N.W.2d
195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 2884 (2004).
3. The trial court dismissed the negli-
gence per se, slander per se, and intention-
al/negligent infliction of emotional distress
causes of action. Sheila C. v. Povich, 768
N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
4. Sheila C., 768 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
5. Id. at 576.
6. Id. at 577.
7. Sheila C., 11 A.D.3d at 130.
8. Id. at 126.
9. Id.
10. People v. Schnmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, No. 222834,
2002 Mich. App. Lexis 71 (Jan. 22, 2002).
11. Graves v. Warner Bros., 656 N.W.2d
195, 198 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
12. Robin Famoso, Note: Ambush TV:
Holding Talk Shows Liable for the Public
Disclosure of Private Facts, 1998 RUTGERS
L.J. 579 (1998).
13. Jason S. Schlessel, Note: The Deep
Pocket Dilemma: Setting the Parameters of
Talk Show Liability, 20 CARDozo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 461, 486 (2002).
14. Richard M. Goehler & Jill Meyer
Vollman, Expansion of Tort Law at the
Expense of the First Amendment: Has the
Jones Court Gone Too Far? Stay Tuned to
Find Out, 27 N. Ky. L. REv. 112, 115 (2000).
15. Graves, 656 N.W.2d at 202-03.
16. Id. at 207.
17. Id. at 211.
18. 857 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App. 1993).
19. Id. at 706.
20. 106 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1997).
21. Id. at 220.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 221.
24. Id. at 222.
25. Id.
26. Fronning v. Jones, No. 94-2205, 1996
U.S. App. Lexis 5725 (6th Cir. Feb. 23, 1996).
27. Id. at *5.
28. Id.
29. 983 F Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
30. Id. at 709.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
33. Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 459 (1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(quoting with approval proposed
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652C
(Draft No. 13, 1967))).
34. Id. (citations omitted).
(Continued on page 25)
10 ED Communications Lawyer l Spring 2005
argument could effectively narrow the
class of conduct falling within the ambit
of the First Amendment.
Finally, the government is pressing
a limiting view of the compelled speech
doctrine. Building on the Court's recent
decision in Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Association' (discussed
above), the federal defendants contend
that the doctrine is inapplicable to the
Solomon Amendment, because the
expression in question is "government
speech" and, therefore, entirely beyond
the purview of the First Amendment.
This case thus presents the Court with its
first opportunity to elaborate on newly
clarified "government speech" theory.
Whether the Court will accept the
government's invitation to reshape free
speech doctrine in the context of the
FAIR case, of course, remains unclear.
But given the complex, intersecting
First Amendment issues at play in
FAIR, the free speech bar undoubtedly
will follow the case with great interest.
Tory v. Cochran
On May 31, 2005, the United States
Supreme Court in Tory v. Cochran8
vacated a broad injunction obtained by
famed lawyer Johnnie Cochran prevent-
ing a former client from picketing and
publicly speaking about Cochran, hold-
ing that the injunction lacked justifica-
tion after Cochran's recent death and
was an unconstitutional restraint on the
client's First Amendment rights. The
Court did so, however, without passing
on the more significant First Amendment
questions presented by the case.
The case grew out of a successful
defamation action brought in California
by Cochran against Ulysses Tory. The
state trial court found that Tory had
engaged in an extended campaign of
unlawful defamatory activity, and further
that he had used such defamatory speech
in at attempt to coerce Cochran into pay-
ing him a monetary "tribute" to desist
from his activities. The court issued an
injunction preventing Tory and his asso-
ciates from picketing Cochran's offices
and from making any oral statements
about Cochran in any public forum. The
California Court of Appeal affirmed, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine "[w]hether a permanent
injunction as a remedy in a defamation
action, preventing all future speech about
an admitted public figure, violates the
First Amendment."
While the case was pending, and
after oral argument, Cochran died.
Counsel for Cochran and his widow,
who was substituted as respondent,
moved the Court to dismiss the case as
moot. In a seven-to-two opinion, the
Court vacated the judgment of the
California Court of Appeal. Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, first
held that the case did not become moot
upon Cochran's death. Noting that no
California law automatically invalidated
the injunction, and that Tory could not
know whether the injunction was void
until a court ruled on it, the Court
observed that the injunction continued
to restrain Tory's speech and therefore
presented an ongoing controversy.
But the Court went on to note that,
although it did not moot the case,
Cochran's death did make unnecessary
any consideration of "petitioners' basic
claims." "Rather," the Court explained,
"we need only point out that the injunc-
tion, as written, has lost its underlying
rationale," which was to prevent Tory
from coercing Cochran to pay him a
tribute. As a result, the injunction as
written became "an overly broad prior
restraint upon speech, lacking plausible
justification." Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, dissented, arguing that
the writ of certiorari should have been
dismissed as improvidently granted, and
criticizing the majority for "strain[ing]
to reach the merits of the injunction
after Cochran's death."
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